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Abstract---schemed fraudsters often flip behavior in terms of 
circumstances change as camouflage for disguising malicious 
actions in online auctions. For instance, the fake transaction 
records interwoven with real trades are indistinguishable from 
legitimate transaction histories. The ways of fraudulent 
behavior changes formulate different types of tricks for 
swindling. To avoid trading with fraudsters, recognizing the 
types of fraudulent behavior changes in advance is helpful in 
choosing appropriate trading partners. Therefore, in order to 
distinguish the types of behavior changes from different 
fraudsters, clustering techniques were applied such as X­
Means for grouping in characteristics. Afterwards, C4.5 
decision trees were employed for inducing the rules of the 
labeled clusters. In this study, the real transaction data of 236 
proven fraudsters was collected from Yahoo!Taiwan for 
testing. The experimental results demonstrate that the 
fraudsters are categorized into 4 natural groups and the vast 
majority of fraudster, 93% of fraudsters on average, follows 
certain default models to develop a scam. The findings of this 
study also make online auction early fraud detection possible. 
Keywords- clustering; decision trees; e-commerce; fraud 
detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the statistics of Internet Crime Complaint 
Center in recent years, online auction fraud has been 
occupying a large of percentage [1]. Each schemed fraud 
was prepared by deliberate premeditation, not by 
coincidence. The preparation work of a fraud is a composite 
of behavior for appealing innocent buyers, such as raising 
reputation score. To keep away online auction fraud, 
recognizing the categories of fraud is helpful in choosing 
appropriate countermeasure against different fraudsters. 
Originally, open information of transaction histories is 
useful to evaluate the credit level of a trading partner. 
However, those schemed fraudsters take it as a swindling 
tool to raise reputation for deceiving traders. Since schemed 
fraudsters are good at disguising malicious behavior and 
interleaving regular trades in their transaction histories, 
online auction fraud has become one of the most serious 
threats in Internet frauds [2]. For instance, they usually 
manipulate feedback score with different tricks for 
fabricating reputation. Notwithstanding their schemes for 
raising reputation score could be quite sophisticated, it is 
inevitable to leave some traits of committing a fraud in their 
transaction histories, such as the trend and magnitude of 
irregular behavior changes. This kind of abnormal behavior 
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definitely reflects the results on the corresponding reputation 
management systems. Unfortunately, most traders could 
identifY only part of fraudulent behavior without assistance 
from other information resources in usual. One of most 
popular solutions is to apply a fraud detection system that 
comprises known behavior patterns to inspect a suspicious 
account. Apparently, the kind of detection systems is only 
able to detect those fraudsters whose features of behavior 
exactly matched with existing behavior patterns. However, 
fraudsters often change their tricks in terms of current 
circumstances dynamically. As a consequence, even a minor 
modification for a trick could affect the accuracy of a fraud 
detection mechanism. Notwithstanding the changes of 
behavior cause fraud detection harder, the fraudulent 
behavior still follows certain models or types in most cases 
of fraud. It is impossible to make a detection mechanism has 
zero misclassification as expected as a new upcoming trick. 
Therefore, we take the types of tricks for committing a 
fraud into account to categorize fraudulent behavior into 
natural groups in characteristics by clustering techniques. 
Afterwards, to identifY a minor modification of a trick, the 
similarities to existing fraudulent patterns were calculated to 
enhance the effectiveness of fraud detection. 
In this study, we employ X-means algorithm, which is an 
extended K-means clustering technique to categorize 236 
proven fraudsters in Yahoo!Taiwan into 4 types. In addition, 
C4.5 algorithm was applied for explaining the rules of the 
labeled fraudulent behaviors respectively. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 
is related work on types of anomalies, measuring attributes in 
online auctions, and clustering techniques we applied. The 
third section is to discuss the behavior changes from our 
observations. Section 4 presents fraudster clusters in nature. 
The experimental results are presented in the section 5. 
Finally, conclusions and future research directions are 
mentioned in the last section. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In the real world, there are merely very few auction 
fraudsters among the vast majority of legitimate accounts. 
That is, a fraudster is anomaly in online auctions. Therefore, 
online auction fraudster detection refers to the problem of 
finding fraudulent behavior patterns in transaction histories. 
In other words, online auction fraud detection is one of 
applications of anomaly detection. The capability of 
identifYing anomalies determines the effectiveness of a fraud 
detection system. For instance, Rubin proposes a new 
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reputation system to help buyers identifY anomalies in online 
auctions such as sellers whose auctions seem price-inflated 
etc. [3]. 
A. Types of Anomalies 
The key components of anomaly detection are in 
associated with anomaly detection techniques including the 
nature of the data, availability of labeled data, and type of 
anomalies to be detected. In addition, anomalies can be 
categorized into following 3 types [4]: 
1) Point Anomalies 
2) Contextual Anomalies 
3) Collective Anomalies . Such as a credit card fraud defined only amount spent IS a 
classic point anomaly. If a transaction were higher than the 
normal range of expediture for that person, it could be a 
fraud. Similar situations often occur in online auctions, 
traders usually estimate corresponding trading partners only 
with accumulated negative ratings. 
According to our observations, a schemed fraud could be 
a contextual anomaly. Contextual anomalies refer to an 
instance is anomalous in a specific condition, but not 
otherwise. The context of an instance is a part of fraud 
formulation. For instance, the more positive ratings a trading 
participant got the higher reputatio? he has. �?wever,. �he context of a fraud is the high denSIty of obtammg POSItIve 
ratings which implies reputation inflation. Therefore, each 
case of fraud should be defined by contextual attributrtes and 
behavior attributes. 
Not only can a fraudster activate a fraud, but also a 
group of accounts as well such as an accomplice syndicate. 
However, not all members of the syndicate committed the 
fraud and most of them look like legitimate accounts 
individually. As the collection of related instances is 
anomalous with respect to the entire data set is a collective 
anomaly. The three types of anomalies could be presented in 
online auctions in general. 
B. Measuring Attributes 
A set of appropriate measuring attributes can depict the 
features of a fraudster precisely for building behavior models. 
To observe the behavior changes of a fraudster, first and 
foremost is to determine which measuring attributes are 
applied to describe fraudulent behavior. Chau �nd Faloutsos 
defined 17 price-oriented attributes for detectmg fraudsters 
in online auctions [5] that includes median prices of items 
sold, median prices of items bought, standard deviation of 
the prices of items sold, standard deviation of the prices of 
items bought within the first 15, first 30, last 30, and last 15 
days in transaction history. In addition, the .ratio of the number of items bought to that of all transactIOns. The 17 
measuring attributes could depict point anomalies and part of 
contextual anomalies with statistic values. 
To enhance the capability of depicting contextual 
anomalies, Chang and Chang defined another 7 measuring 
attributes as follows [8]: 
1) Density of obtaining positive ratings 
2) Density of obtaining negative ratings 
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3) Density of obtaining positive ratings after closing bid 
4) Given being a seller, the ratio of positive ratings 
from other sellers to all positive ratings 
5) Time difference from the last negative rating to the 
current time 
6) Ratio of positive ratings to total feedback count 
7) Ratio of negative ratings to total feedback 
The combination of the two sets of measuring attributes 
above that includes behavior attributes, statistic attributes 
and particular values was proven effective in online auction 
fraudster detection in previous experiments. 
C. Clustering Techniques 
Clustering is a simple and straightforward technique to 
partition instances into disjoint groups [9]. �-me.ans i� one of the classic clustering techniques usmg an IteratIve distance­
based algorithm. In advance, the number of clusters sh?uld 
be determined by the parameter k. Then the algOrIthm 
randomly chooses k points as cluster centers. Subsequ�ntly, 
each instance is assigned into its closest center by EuclIdean 
distance function, as finding the nearest neighbors. And then 
the mean of distances in each cluster will be calculated as 
new center values for each cluster. That is, each iteration 
process produces a set of cluster centers and all instances 
must be examined and assigned to the nearest center. 
Iteration processes will be continued until �e. same poin.ts are assigned to each cluster centers has stabIlIzed and wIll 
remain the same forever [7]. 
In following experiments, we apply X-Means instead, 
which is an extended version of K-means clustering 
technique in structure implemented by Weka 3.7.0, to 
analyze behavior changes of online auction fraudsters who 
are divided into natural groups by characteristics rather than 
default classes. X-Means improves the computation for 
searching the space of cluster locations and number clusters 
to optimize the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
measure. It attempts to split the center in its region. X-Means 
compares the BIC-values of the two structures between the 
children of each center and itself to make decision [8]. 
III. BEHAVIOR OF FRAUDSTERS 
A. Earlier-Phased Behavior Simulation 
A premeditated scam is a sophisticated composite of 
behavior changes along with different tricks. According to 
our observations, there always is a certain break point 
between activating a fraud and its preparation work. In 
general, the descriptive value of each measuring attribute 
reflects the level of current situation or behavior status only. 
Therefore it is difficult to identifY a fraudster who fabricates 
feedback 
'
score as camouflage with bare eyes, especially 
before a fraud being activated. 
To simulate the processes of fraudulent preparation work, 
we extract part of the transaction histories for monitoring 
easily. To look backward the earlier stages of a fraudster, cut 
the last part of transaction history off is a si�p.le �nd straight approach for simulation. Thus, a phased partItIOnIng method 
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was developed for simulating the behavior in the earlier 
phases. The transaction history of a proven fraudster was 
suspended or voided is treated as a complete lifespan. Hence, 
we used the percentage of a transaction history to indicate 
the earlier phases for preparation work. 
Both the count of ratings and the duration of being at the 
site could present the lifespan of a fraudster. In addition, a 
transaction history consists of information about positive 
ratings and negative ratings mainly. Hence, Chang and 
Chang proposed a method for partitioning transaction 
histories as follows [6]: The length of a transaction history 
equals to the count of accumulated ratings. Thus, given an 
account u and its transaction history TH(u)= {tr], tr], "', trn}, 
the r'% lifespan of u is denoted as TH(u, rOlo)={trJ, tr], "', 
tr d}, and d=f n*rOlo l. The rOlo of transaction history indicates 
the rOlo earlier stage of its lifespan. For example, if n=60, then 
TH(u, 80%) would be { trJ, tr2, "', tr48 }(See Fig. 1) 
Obtaining a positive rating 
-� Obtaining a negative rating 
r---- Phase 900'" ----II 54 "60' 90% 1---- Phase 80"A. ---tl 48::; 60' 80% 
r n 3ed r r 4T T Tr T 
10 1 2345 ..... 5051 52 .. ............ 80 .. ............. 100 Day 1 
Figure 1. Phased partition of transaction history 
B. Difficulites of Fraudulent Behavior Detection 
There are several challenges and difficulties of online 
auction fraud detection as follows: 
1) The boundary between normal and anomalous 
behavior is often not precise 
2) In online auctions, fraudulent behavior keeps 
evolving and stable patterns might not sufficiently depict 
fraudsters. 
3) Sometimes a small deviation from legitimate 
accounts might be an anomaly, but some fluctuations in the 
trading behavior might be considered as normal. 
4) It is very difficult to distinguish the behavior of a 
normal account containing noise data is simliar to actual 
anomalies. 
To resolve the problems above, we adopt a composite of 
measuring attributes that includes statistic values, particular 
values, and contextual values for depicting fraudulent 
features from different aspects. We use some statistic value 
as measuring attributes to take the advantage of controlling 
small deviation. In particular, we emphasize the contextual 
situation description in following experiments for 
compensating the ambiguity between normal and abnormal 
behavior. Therefore, some particular values were introduced 
for indicating certain contextual situations. To overcome 
these difficulties above, the method of partitioning 
transaction histories is integrated with previous measured 
attributes for emulating the preparation status of a fraudster, 
the latency period. 
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IV. FRAUDSTER CLUSTERS 
There are different ways in which the result of clustering 
can be expressed [7](See Fig. 2). The presentation of 
clustering should be dictated by the nature of the problem 
that is thought to underlie the particular situation. Thus, 
fraudulent behavior may be categorized into exclusive or 
overlapping clusters. Moreover, it is possible to have these 
clusters in hierarchical or partial hierarchical structure. For 
instance, it could be a crude division of instances at top level. 
Or the clusters are identified probilistic, whereby and 
instance belongs to each group with a certain probability. 
BBrl------, 
B B '-----::_---' 
(A) Exclusive clusters (8) Overlapping clusters 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
(C) Hierarchical clusters 
Figure 2. Different presentation of clusters 
Behavior fluctuation between regularity and irregularity 
is a common trick for schemed fraudsters. The features in the 
different phases of a latency period could be clustered into 
different clusters for pragmatic reasons. The following 
experiments are to discover the types of fraudulent behavior 
changes via clustering. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
We collected the real transaction histories of 236 proven 
fraudsters from the blacklist of Yahoo ! Taiwan. The 
transaction history of each fraudster was partitioned into 5 
different phases based on the count of accumulated ratings, 
such as phase 100%, 95%, 90%, 85% and 80%, as Fig. 1 
illustrates. Each specific phased profile contains 24 numeric 
values by the proposed composite of measuring attributes. 
As a result, the data set consists of 1,180 phased profiles for 
testing. The experimental results explain that most fraudsters 
followed specific formulations to change behavior. 
A. Results of Clustering by Mixed Phased Profiles 
Table 1 shows the experimental results of applying X­
Means algorithm, in which the total 1,180 fraudulent profiles 
are categorized into 4 clusters. The 4 clusters indicate the 
nature of online auction fraudsters in characteristics, which 
are respectively labeled by type 0, type 1, type 3 and type 4. 
Type 2 is the most popular type of fraud that occupied 39% 
of online auction fraudsters. Type 0 occupied 31 %, type 1 is 
21% and only 9% of fraudsters belong to type 3. The rest of 
them were shown in Tablel. 
TABLE I. RESULTS OF CLUSTERING 
Type 0 Type l Type 2 Type 3 
Phase100% 72 51 93 20 
Phase 95% 73 50 93 20 
Phase 90% 72 51 91 22 
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Phase 85% 73 50 90 23 
Phase 80% 73 49 91 23 
Total 363 251 458 108 
*Percentaee 31% 21% 39% 9% 
* The percentage for each individual type of fraudulent behavior being occupied 
According the statistics of Table 2, almost all different 
phased profiles of an account have been assigned into the 
same cluster. Performing continuous tests to a suspect before 
he has been suspended would be helpful in identifying to 
which type of fraudster he belongs. 96% of Type 0 fraudsters 
could be identified into the same type whether their current 
phases are. The rest of types presents similar results, 92% of 
Type 1, 96% of Type 2 and 87% of Type 3 could be 
identified in all 5 phases. Averagely, 93% of fraudsters will 
follow the same model to develop their schemes during the 
entire lifespan. The results denote the behavior of most 
fraudsters might be detected as early as possible. 
TABLE II. THE COUNTS OF BEING IDENTIFIED BY PHASED PROFILES 
Phases 1 2 3 4 5 *Percental!:e Averal!:e 
Type 0 2 0 I 71 96% 
0 93% 
Type I 0 2 I 48 92% 
1 
Type I 2 I 0 90 96% 
2 
Type 0 I 2 0 20 87% 
3 
*The percentage of the type of fraudsters can be categorized into the same type in all 5 phases 
According to the experimental results, most fraudsters 
will keep following a type of model in general. Fig. 3 shows 
that general fraudulent behavior develops linearly with 
respect to phase progress. 
Features in phase r%, F(r%) 
F(100%) TWeO 
F(85%) 
, TWe1 
F(80%) 
F(100%) 
F(90%) 
� , ...... �� ........................ . � TWe2 
Origin 
General Type 0 behavior 
General Type 1 behavior 
General Type 2 behavior 
General Type 3 behavior 
: TWeJ 
80% 85% 90% 95% 100% Phase 
Figure 3. General Fraudulent Behavior Development 
Some cunning fraudsters' behavior may not always keep 
stable to develop with respect to the same model as expected. 
In addition, even a regular legitimate account sometimes will 
change their purchase habits instantly as well under certain 
circumstances. 
B. Early Fraud Detection 
Since the experimental results above indicate that the X­
Means clustering algorithm could identify a fraudster in the 
earlier phases before the time of being suspended (Phase 
100%), it makes early online fraud detection possible. 
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To discover the implications of different types, C4.5 
decision trees were employed with 10 folds cross validation 
to induce rules as follows: 
DensityOtNeg <= 0.633333 
I RatioOfBuyingRate <= 0.333333 
I I MdSellingFirst15 <= 11150 
I I I DensityOtNeg <= 0.541667: Typel 
I I I DensityOtNeg > 0.541667 
I I I I MdSellingFirst15 <= 2570: Type I 
I I I I MdSellingFirst15 > 2570: TypeO 
I I MdSellingFirst15> 11150: TypeO 
RatioOfBuyingRate > 0.333333 
I RatioOfBuyingRate <= 0.375 
I I MdBuyingFirst15 <= 900: Typel 
I I MdBuyingFirst15 > 900: Type3 
I I RatioOfBuyingRate > 0.375: Type3 
DensityOtNeg > 0.633333 
I RatioOfBuyingRate <= 0.190476 
I I StdBuyingFirst15 <= 7.545694: TypeO 
I I StdBuyingFirst15 > 7.545694 
I I I MdBuyingFirst15 <= 305: Type2 
I I I MdBuyingFirst15 > 305: TypeO 
I RatioOfBuyingRate > 0.190476 
I MdSellingFirst30 <= 9300 
I StdSellingFirst15 <= 238.5 
I StdBuyingFirst30 <= 1341.155721 
I StdSellingLast15 <= 6320.551796 
I I StdBuyingLast30 <= 755.323698: Type2 
I I StdBuyingLast30 > 755.323698 
I I I DensityOtNeg <= 0.804878 Type3 
I I I DensityOtNeg > 0.804878: Type2 
I StdSellingLastl5 > 6320.551796 
I I MdBuyingFirst15 <= 450: TypeO 
I I MdBuyingFirst15 > 450: Type2 
StdBuyingFirst30> 1341.155721 
I MdBuyingFirst15 <= 3050: Type3 
I MdBuyingFirst15 > 3050: Type2 
StdSellingFirst15 > 238.5 
I MdSellingLast15 <= 11400: Type3 
I I MdSell ingLast I 5 > 11400: Type2 
MdSellingFirst30> 9300: TypeO 
We scrutinize the above rules, most Type 2 and Type 3 
fraudsters got higher density of obtaining negative ratings, 
and the prices of purchased commodities are lower on 
average. They might raise credit by purchasing the items 
with smaller amount money. On the contrary, Type 0 and 
Type 1 of fraudsters got lower density of obtaining negative 
ratings, and the higher prices of purchased goods. 
Type 0 is traditional premeditated fraudster who got very 
high density of obtaining positive ratings for raising credit 
score in very short period. Type 3 could be a kind of very 
cunning schemed fraudster who used to flip behavior to 
appeal targets. All 1,180 profiles were labeled by the results 
of clustering; the averaged recall rate is 98.6% (see Table 3). 
TABLE III. OUTCOME OF ApPLYING C4.5 DECISION TREES 
TPRate FPRate Precision Recall F-Measure Class 
0.989 0.006 0.986 0.989 0.988 Type 0 
0.984 0.002 0.992 0.984 0.988 Type I 
0.989 0.007 0.989 0.989 0.989 Type 2 
0.972 0.004 0.963 0.972 0.968 Type 3 
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Table 4 shows that prediction errors occurred in the 
previous experiment by C4.5. The results demonstrate that 
Type 0 and Type 3 are exclusive, but Type 0 might be 
misidentified as Type 1 or Type 2. Type 1 could only be 
misidentified as Type3, neither the other types. Type 2 and 
Type 1 are exclusive too. It is more difficult to identify Type 
fraudster by clustering. 
TABLE IY. PREDICTION ERRORS 
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
* Type 0 X 
* Tvpe 1 X X 
* Tvpe 2 X X 
* Tvpe 3 X X 
*Predicted class; X denotes incorrect predicted class 
C. Changes of Fraudulent Behavior 
Referring to Table 5, there are 7 of the 236 fraudsters 
who switch their behavior into different types during the 
entire lifespan. The 7 instances indicate the phenomenon of 
overlapping clusters in Section 4. Table 5 also explains why 
the changes of fraudulent behavior affect the accuracy of 
clustering. 
TABLEV. FRAUDULENT BERA VIOR SWITRING PATTERNS 
Fraudster 
PhaselOO% T e 2  
Phase 95% T e 2  
Phase 90% T e 2  
Phase 85% T e 3  
Phase 80% T e 3  
We listed the results of clustering for analyzing in details. 
There are 3 kinds of behavior switching patterns between 
types that include Type 0 and Type 1, Type 1 and Type 2, 
and Type 2 and Type3. Whereas, Type 0 and Type 3 are 
mutually exclusive as follows: 
1) Type 0 and Type 1: Fraudster AI, A2, A3 
2) Type I and Type 2: Fraudster A4 
3) Type 2 and Type 3: Fraudster A5, A6, A7 
Behavior Features In Phase r% 
Feature(Phase "lor, ................................................................... j Type 0 
••.••••••.••.••.••••••••••••.••.••••.• ; 0.' Acoounl A1 - - : Type 1 
A1 
A7 
,./" ! j Type 2 
------------------�-.::.-.. ..": �-----------t , ...... , 1 .. __ ;-... , Account A7 : Type 3 
.. :::. -- --
-- i :---------! 
80% 85% 90% 95% 1000/0 Phase 
Figure 4. 2 Examples of fraudulent behavior switching 
Fig. 4 shows account Al and A2 didn't follow the default 
models linearly with respect to corresponding phases. 
Fraudster A 1 develops his scheme in phase 80%-85% as 
Type 0, and then he changes his behavior into Type 1 when 
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he steps into phase 90%. Account A 7 originally develops his 
scheme as Type 2, whereas he turned his scheme into Type 3 
at the point of phase 90%. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Fraudulent behavior changes have been perplexing the 
construction of fraudulent behavior models. The 
experimental results show that applying clustering 
techniques to categorize fraudulent behavior into natural 
groups is helpful in discovering fraudsters as early as 
possible. In spite of which kind of tricks fraudsters apply, the 
vast majority of fraudster will still follow certain models to 
develop scams in general. In other words, this finding infers 
that fraudster could be identified in their earlier phases, even 
in phase 80%. 
The similarity metrics of clustering techniques are similar 
to instance-based learning classification methods. In 
clustering, it groups different behavior in which all instances 
are processed altogether, whereas applying instance-based 
learning algorithm of which test instances are calculated 
individually. Therefore, the results of clustering could be 
applied to label outcome classes for enhancing the 
functionality of a supervised classification method. Hence, 
we are going to apply different instance-based learning 
algorithms to identify fraudulent behavior as the future 
research directions. In addition, hierarchical cluster analyses 
could be conducted to refine fraudulent behavior changes in 
details for further applications. 
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